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Comment
Keeping Children Out of Double Jeopardy: An
Assessment of Punishment and Megan's Law in
Doe v. Poritz
Kirsten R. Bredlie*
On July 29, 1994, convicted pedophile Jesse Timmende-
quas lured seven-year-old Megan Kanka into his house, where
he sexually assaulted her and strangled her to death with a
belt.' At the time of the murder, Timmendequas lived with two
other convicted sex offenders across the street from Megan.2
Outraged by Megan's death, New Jersey residents demanded
that the state reevaluate its policies toward sex offenders.3
The residents argued that they had a right to know when a
convicted sex offender moves into their neighborhood.'
The New Jersey legislature passed Megan's Law5 in re-
sponse to public pressure6 and reports indicating that repeat
offenders pose a danger to public safety.7 Modeled in part after
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1994,
Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota.
1. Ralph Siegel, Suspect Admits Killing Girl, RECORD (New Jersey),
Aug. 2, 1994, at Al.
2. James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 64, 66.
3. See Siegel supra note 1, at Al.
4. Jan Hoffman, New Law Is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1994, at Bl.
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995).
6. Joyce Price, States Find New Ways to Stop Sex Offenders, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at Al (discussing public pressure to pass Megan's Law).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1995) embodies the New Jersey legis-
lature's statement of purpose:
The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders who commit other
predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by persons
who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a system of
registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and
alert the public when necessary for the public safety.
Id.
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the Washington State Community Protection Act of 1990,8 Me-
gan's Law requires convicted sex offenders to register with lo-
cal police.9 It also authorizes local law enforcement to notify
communities that a sex offender is present in their neighbor-
hood1° based on determinations of the dangerousness of the of-
fender, including the likelihood of recidivism. 1
In Doe v. Poritz,12 a convicted sex offender challenged Me-
gan's Law, alleging that it imposed punishment in violation of
the ex post facto, 3 double jeopardy, 4 and cruel and unusual
punishment protections.' 5 Applying a test for determining
The New Jersey legislature relied on studies that "[a]s a group, sex of-
fenders are more likely than other repeat offenders to re-offend with sex
crimes or other violent crimes." Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 375 (N.J. 1995)
(citing Response Brief for Attorney General at 8-10). The statistics the Attor-
ney General cited include:
A major Justice Department study of state prisoners released in one
year showed that 7.7% of released rapists were 10.5 times more likely
to be rearrested for rape than were other released prisoners....
[L]ikewise, prisoners who had served time for other sexual assaults
were 7.5 times more likely than other released prisoners to be rear-
rested for sexual assault.
Id.
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996) (codifying
Washington's "Community Notification Act" that authorizes police to release
necessary information regarding sex offenders to protect the public).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 to -5 (West 1995) (codifying registration
provisions).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -11 (West 1995) (codifying notification
provisions).
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995). The statute sets up three lev-
els of notification based on the risk of re-offense, id., and the statute includes
a list of factors to be considered in making a determination as to the risk of re-
offense. See infra note 57 (listing the factors considered). The statute also
delegates the authority to "promulgate guidelines and procedures for notifi-
cation" to the Attorney General. § 2C:7-8.
12. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). Plaintiff further sought an injunction bar-
ring the application of Megan's Law to him. Id. at 380. John S. Furlong, the
attorney for the plaintiff, applied for United States Supreme Court review on
October 24, 1995. Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law Goes to Top Court, RECORD
(New Jersey) Oct. 25, 1995, at A01.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Section 10 of
Article I, forbids any state from making laws that punish individuals "after
the fact" for acts previously committed. The plaintiff in Doe v. Poritz con-
tended that the 1994 Act's Community Notification and Registration Provi-
sions were impermissible ex post facto violations because they imposed addi-
tional "punishment" subsequent to his convictions. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 380-81.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV. The plaintiff argued such a punish-
ment would cause sex offenders to be effectively retried for the same crime in
contravention of the Double Jeopardy Clause which prohibits the government
from punishing an individual twice for the same crime.
15. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. The plaintiff claimed that Megan's Law
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whether a law is punitive, based on its own interpretation of
precedent, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Megan's
Law was not punitive and therefore did not violate the Consti-
tution.' 6
Poritz charts a new course in determining the constitu-
tionality of sex offender registration and notification laws.17
No definitive test currently exists for assessing whether a law
is punitive. Courts considering challenges to registration and
notification provisions in other jurisdictions have relied on a
variety of tests and arrived at opposing results.1 8 The Poritz
court's decision to uphold Megan's Law casts a new light on the
question of whether registration and notification laws actually
constitute punishment.
This Comment critically examines the Doe v. Poritz deci-
sion and its effects on the standard of review applied to sex of-
fender registration and notification laws. Part I provides an
overview of other states' registration and notification laws, ad-
dresses the development of Megan's Law, and discusses consti-
tutional challenges to these provisions. Part II outlines the
holding and reasoning of Doe v. Poritz. Part IH compares the
Poritz court's reasoning to that of other courts considering
challenges to registration and notification laws and argues that
the United States Supreme Court should affirm the Poritz de-
cision and uphold Megan's Law as remedial, not punitive. This
Comment concludes that the Court should adopt the Poritz test
when determining the constitutionality of all state sex offender
registration and notification laws.
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it subjects sex offenders to
harassment, ostracism and vigilantism. 662 A.2d at 380.
16. 662 A.2d at 372. The court also held that "the prosecutor's decision to
provide community notification, including the manner of notification is subject
to judicial review before such notification is given, and that such notification
is constitutionally required." Id. The court reasoned that notice to the of-
fender, and the opportunity for judicial review prior to notification was re-
quired to satisfy procedural due process. Id. at 382.
17. In the conclusion to its opinion, the Poritz majority acknowledged that
its decision sailed into "truly uncharted waters, for no other state has adopted
such a far reaching statute." Id. at 422.
18. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (detailing the divisions
among the different courts).
1996]
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I. MEGAN'S LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, AND
THE PUNISHMENT DETERMINATION
A. OVERVIEW OF REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS
AND MEGAN'S LAW
Washington state passed the nation's first notification law,
the 1990 Community Protection Act, 9 in response to public
outrage over the brutal attack on a seven-year-old boy by Earl
Shriner, a convicted child molester.2 ° Evidence discovered af-
ter the attack revealed that the state released Shriner
"knowing he might still be dangerous."2' The Washington state
legislature believed that by requiring sex offenders to register
with local police and authorizing police to notify the commu-
nity of the presence of sex offenders, it could reduce the likeli-
hood of such repeat attacks.2 Media attention to brutal at-
tacks on children by repeat offenders in other states, including
New Jersey, prompted other legislatures to enact registration
and notification laws.23
19. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996).
20. Erin Gunn, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The "Preda-
tory" Requirement, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 277, 277 (1994). Shriner raped him,
stabbed him, and cut off his penis, but the boy survived the attack and identi-
fied Shriner. Popkin, supra note 2, at 66.
21. Popkin, supra note 2, at 66. Shriner had apparently "confided to a
cellmate his continuing fantasies of molesting and murdering children." Id.
22. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996) (Historical
and Statutory Notes) (quoting Washington legislature's findings and declara-
tion of policy).
23. See Patricia Lopez Baden, Proposal Would Require That Sex Offend-
ers Be Identified to Neighbors, STAR-TRIB. (Minnesota) Feb. 13, 1995, at Al
("In Minnesota, much of the push for notification can be traced to the state's
most notorious sex offender. Dennis Linehan raped and murdered a 14-year-
old Shoreview girl in 1965, escaped from prison in 1975 and tried to rape a 12-
year-old Michigan girl."); Peter Baker & Marylou Tousignant, An Early Eye on
the Spoils of Fall Vote, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1995, at VI (discussing publicity
surrounding convicted child molester Timothy K Walsh as a motivation for
the passage of a notification law in Virginia); Lourdes Medrano Leslie, Sex-
Offender Notification Debated, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al
(explaining how the publicity surrounding release of pedophile James R. Sin-
gleton prompted Arizona legislators to pass notification laws).
Not surprisingly, some of the most effective lobbyists have been parents
of victims. See John Affleck, New York Senate Passes Its Own "Megan's Law,"
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERVICE, May 24, 1995 (noting that Megan's mother,
Maureen Kanka, campaigned for the passage of the New York law); Michael
Gillis, Spare No Cost to Protect Kids, Victims' Moms Say, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1995, at 6 (noting that six Illinois mothers of murder victims are
"pushing for uniform standards for treating juvenile sex offenders, mandatory
504
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Registration provisions require released offenders to regis-
ter themselves with local police.24 In contrast, notification
provisions authorize the police to notify the public of an of-
fender's presence in the community. 25 Several states have en-
acted registration laws that do not provide for notification. 26
Others, like New Jersey, include both registration and notifi-
cation provisions.
1. Registration Laws
Forty-seven states have now enacted some form of regis-
tration law.2' Although registration laws vary, most fit into
one of the following categories:29 laws that release registration
information ° to law enforcement personnel,3' laws that inform
selected government agencies, 32 or laws that make information
notification of victims' families when offenders are put on probation and more
money for the state program for searching for missing children); Jefferson
Robbins, Kramers Back Notification Bill: Neighbors Would Know Pedophiles,
STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Illinois), Oct. 6, 1995, at 13 (discussing pleas by
Brad and Sally Kramer, whose three-year-old daughter Sara was found mur-
dered in the Sangamon River, to the Illinois state legislature to pass an
amendment to the state's Child Sex Offender Registration Act to provide for
notification).
24. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 to -5 (West 1995) (codifying regis-
tration provisions).
25. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -11 (West 1995) (codifying notifi-
cation provisions).
26. Twenty-nine of the forty-seven states that have enacted registration
laws include notification provisions. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying
text (discussing registration and notification provisions).
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995).
28. Bill Alden, Rochester Judge Rejects Challenge to Megan's Law, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 20, 1996, at 1.
29. See Matthew J. Herman, Note, Are the Children of Illinois Protected
from Sex Offenders?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 883, 893-98 (1995) (discussing
the three types of registration laws).
30. Typically the sex offender must release his or her name, age, race,
physical description, current and permanent addresses, and employment in-
formation to the local police. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-4 (West Supp.
1996) (specifying registration requirements).
31. The majority of states fall into this category. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-12-909 (Michie 1995) (providing that "[tihe statements or any other
information required by this subchapter shall not be open to inspection by the
public").
32. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing
for release of registration information to law enforcement agencies, schools,
state agencies which license individuals to work with children, licensed child
care facilities, and any other organization that works with children and re-
quests the registry).
1996]
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available to the public.33 Most states require sex offenders to
register for ten years.34  The penalty for failure to register
ranges from an additional year of probation to an additional
year of incarceration.35
In 1994, Congress enacted a federal registration law mod-
eled after Washington's Community Protection Act.36 The Ja-
cob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act (SVORA) provides for nationwide
registration. 37 It requires sex offenders who committed crimes
against children3 8 or sexually violent offenses39 to register with
a designated state law enforcement agency for ten years after
they are released from prison or placed on probation.' Those
sex offenders found to be "sexually violent predators" are re-
33. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 & Historical and Statu-
tory Notes (West Supp. 1996) (providing for release of information to the pub-
lic because "[riestrictive confidentiality and liability laws governing the re-
lease of information about sexual offenders have reduced willingness to
release information that could be appropriately released under the public dis-
closure laws, and have increased risks to public safety").
New York's registration law uses a unique system which enables resi-
dents to access the state registry by dialing a 900 number. Sex Offender
Registration Act, ch. 192, § 168-p, 1995 N.Y. LAWS 933-34. A task force in
Arizona has suggested a similar system. Associated Press, Task Force Sug-
gests Methods of Registering Sex Offenders, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 1995, at
Al. The Oregon State Police maintain a toll-free number for victims to obtain
information from the registry. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.601 (Supp. 1996).
34. Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Of-
fender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's
"Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L. REV. 219, 235 (1995)
35. Id.
36. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Of-
fender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994) [hereinafter SVORA].
37. Id. States have a three-year window within which they must pass a
registration law or else they lose ten percent of their funding under the crime
bill. Id. § 14071(f)(l)-(2).
38. Under subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(3), crimes against children
include kidnapping, false imprisonment, criminal sexual conduct, solicitation
of a minor to engage in sexual conduct, use of a minor in sexual performance,
solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, any conduct that is by its na-
ture a sexual offense, or the attempt of any of the above offenses. Id. §
14071(a)(3)(A).
39. Subparagraph (B) of subsection (a)(3) defines the term "sexually vio-
lent offense" as "any criminal offense that consists of aggravated sexual abuse
or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18 or as de-
scribed in the State criminal code) or an offense that has as its elements en-
gaging in physical contact with another person with intent to commit aggra-
vated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in such sections of Title 18 or
as described in the state criminal code)." Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B).
40. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A).
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quired to register indefinitely.41 The registration requirement
ceases if the court determines that "the person no longer suf-
fers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
would make the person likely to engage in a predatory sexually
violent offense."42
2. Notification Laws
The SVORA also provides for notification.43 Twenty-nine
states have passed laws that include notification."4 Notifica-
tion provisions vary in the amount of discretion local police can
exercise. Washington's 1990 Community Protection Act,45 the
first notification law, served as the model for notification laws
in many states.: It provides broad discretion to local police47
in establishing notification procedures. 4 8
41. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B) (1994).
43. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 1345 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)). The 1996 Amendments to the Act replaced the
permissive language in the original provision, making notification mandatory
when it is "necessary to protect the public." Id. The federal act also provides
immunity for law enforcement agencies and employees who release the infor-
mation in good faith. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (1994).
44. Henry J. Reske, Lawyers Balk at Imposed Pro Bono Sex Cases, A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1996, at 36.
45. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996).
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(7)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring
authorities to give notice to the community where the sexual predator re-
sides).
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(1) (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing
public agencies "to release relevant and necessary information regarding sex
offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for
public protection").
48. Baden, supra note 23. Under Washington's Act, police have generally
followed a three-tier framework of notification. Tier One involves mostly in-
cest cases and requires only notification of local police. Id. At Tier Two,
which includes moderate risk offenders, information is released to schools and
neighborhood groups. Id. Tier Three includes offenders considered the most
dangerous and provides for the broadest notification, allowing police to re-
lease photos, addresses, and criminal history of offenders to newspapers, or to
distribute handbills. Id. Section 4.24.550(2) of the Washington Revised Anno-
tated Code authorizes local law enforcement agencies to decide whether to
release information to the community. Although the statute leaves discretion
to local law enforcement agencies to develop their own standards for release of
information, most agencies follow the three-tier guidelines developed by the
Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs. Jolayne Houtz, When
Do You Unmask a Sexual Predator? SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at B2.
5071996] MEGANMS LAW
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Only a few states place the burden of notifying the com-
munity on the sex offenders themselves. 9 In Louisiana, sex of-
fenders whose victims were under eighteen years old must
send postcards to their neighbors within a one-mile radius in a
rural community or within a three-square-block area in an ur-
ban or suburban community.50 The parole board also has con-
siderable discretion to require other forms of notification.5'
The board may require offenders to put "Sex Offender On
Board" bumper stickers on their cars or wear specially labeled
clothing. 2
3. Megan's Law and Public Protection
Megan's Law includes both registration53 and notification
components. 4 Although modeled after the Washington Act,
New Jersey's Megan's Law is more highly structured, giving
law enforcement less discretion in making notification deci-
sions.5 Indeed, several of the most recently passed notification
laws follow the detailed guidelines of Megan's Law. 6 Megan's
49. In Oregon, sex offenders can be forced to place signs stating "Sex Of-
fender Residence" in the windows of their homes. Baden, supra note 23, at
1A. Under Oregon's laws, some low-risk offenders can "avoid notification by
participating in treatment and rehabilitation programs." Id.; see, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4 (H)(2)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(H)(2)(a)(i) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
Offenders must also publish a notice in the local newspaper on two different
days that includes their names, their addresses, and the crimes for which they
were convicted. § 15:574(H)(2)(b).
51. § 15:574.4(H)(2)(b) ("[Tihe board may order any other form of notice
which it deems appropriate, including but not limited to signs, handbills,
bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to that effect.").
52. Id. The special clothing requirement has prompted critics to describe
Louisiana's law as a "Scarlet Letter" law. Critics compare this law to the let-
ter A that Hester Prynne was required to wear in Nathanial Hawthorne's
classic, The Scarlet Letter. See infra note 79; see also Jerusalem, supra note
34, at 241 ("[Nlearly 350 years after Hester Prynne, Louisiana allows sex of-
fenders to be branded with a 'scarlet letter.'); cf. Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak,
There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child
Molester Is Released into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 743-44 (1995)
(explaining that "Scarlet Letter" conditions segregate offenders from society
and interfere with their ability to reintegrate into the community).
53. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 to -5 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996) (codifying
registration provisions).
54. § 2C:7-6 to -11 (codifying notification provisions).
55. § 2C:7-8.
56. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1-10 (West 1992 & Supp.
1996) (outlining detailed requirements of the regulation); Sex Offender Regis-
508
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Law provides a list of factors relevant to determining the risk
of re-offense, including criminal and psychological history of
the sex offender.5 7 The Attorney General's Guidelines, promul-
gated in conjunction with the passage of Megan's Law,58 follow
a three-tier framework that is similar to Washington's Com-
munity Protection Act.59 The first tier, for low risk of re-
offense, limits notification to law enforcement agencies that are
"likely to encounter"" the offender.6 The second tier, for mod-
tration Act, ch. 192, 1995 N.Y. Laws 168 (echoing the language of Megan's
Law).
57. § 2C:7-8(b). The factors include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including
but not limited to whether the offender is under supervision of pro-
bation or parole; receiving counseling, therapy or treatment; or resid-
ing in a home situation that provides guidance and supervision;
(2) Physical conditions that minimize the risk of re-offense, including
but not limited to advanced age or debilitating illness;
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense, in-
cluding:
(a) Whether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized
by repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term;
(c) Whether the offender committed the sex offense against a
child.
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining the
risk, including:
(a) The relationship between the offender and the victim;
(b) Whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or
infliction of serious bodily injury;
(c) The number, date and nature of prior offenses;
(5) Whether the psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of
recidivism;
(6) The offender's response to treatment;
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under
supervision in the community as well as behavior in the community
following service of sentence; and
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit
additional crimes.
Id.
58. NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL, GUIDELINES FOR LAW EN-
FORCEMENT FOR NOTIFICATION TO LOCAL OFFICLALS AND/OR THE COMMUNITY
OF THE ENTRY OF A SEX OFFENDER INTO THE COMMTNITY (Sept. 14, 1995).
59. Id. at 8-10.
60. The Attorney General's guidelines provide:
The term "likely to encounter" shall mean for purposes of these
guidelines that the law enforcement agency, community organization
or members of the community are in a location or in close geographic
proximity to a location which the offender visits or can be presumed
to visit on a regular basis.
Id. at 6.
6L Id. at 8-9.
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erate risk of re-offense, requires notification of law enforcement
and community organizations in charge of or caring for women
and children who are "likely to encounter" the offender.62 The
third tier, for high risk of re-offense, limits notification to tier-
two groups and members of the community who are "likely to
encounter" the offender. 63
Legislatures enacting registration and notification laws
like Megan's Law, intend to protect the public, particularly
children, from the special harms of sex crimes.6 Commenta-
tors have noted that the brutal nature of sex crimes often cause
public outrage,65 which "may have an enormous symbolic im-
pact on a community."6 6 These attacks "are almost terroristic,
in that they strike people unawares [sic] in their own neigh-
borhoods and provoke distrust, fear, and frustration."67 Thus,
62. Id. at 9-10.
63. Id. at 10.
64. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1995) (indicating the legisla-
ture's intent to protect the public from sex offenders); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996) (quoting Historical and Statutory Notes)
("[Pirotection of the public from sex offenders is a paramount governmental
interest.").
In enacting such laws, legislatures found that sex crimes cause special
harms to their victims such as personal trauma, including "chronic depression
and anxiety, isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse, [and] sui-
cidal behavior" Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 375 (N.J. 1995) (quoting Brief for
the United States). In addition, victims often become perpetrators of sex
crimes later in life:
An especially disturbing finding about child sexual abuse is its strong
intergenerational pattern; in particular, due to the psychological im-
pact of their own abuse, sexually abused boys have been found to be
more likely than non-abused boys to turn into offenders against the
next generation of children, and sexually abused girls are more likely
to become mothers of children who are abused.
Id.
65. Suzanne Fields, The Rights and Wrongs of Megan's Law, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at A19.
66. Criminal Law-Sex Offender Notification Statute-Washington State
Community Protection Act Serves as Model for Other Initiatives by Lawmakers
and Communities-1990 Wash. Laws. Ch. 3, §§ 101-1406 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of Wash. Rev. Code), 108 HARV. L. REv. 787, 790-791
(1995) (discussing the special harms of sex crimes) [hereinafter Criminal
Law].
67. Id. at 791. The commentator further explained, "To confront these
harms, community notification is particularly appropriate given the growing
consensus among psychiatrists that repeat offenders are rarely treatable and
more likely than other convicts to strike again once released from prison." Id.
510
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members of the public feel they have a right to know if a sex of-
fender is living in their neighborhood. 8
Based on the high recidivism rates attributed to sex of-
fenders, legislatures enacting registration and notification laws
conclude that release of offenders from incarceration poses a
unique threat of harm to the public.6 9 According to the United
States Department of Justice, the recidivism rate of untreated
sex offenders is about sixty percent. 7 Attorney General Janet
Reno reports that "convicted child molesters have a recidivism
rate as high as 40 to 75 percent."7 ' Noting the high recidivism
rate, the Washington legislature found that "protection of the
public from sex offenders [was] a paramount governmental in-
terest."72 Moreover, the Washington legislature concluded that
68. Cf Robert L. Jackson, Sex-Offender Notification Laws Facing Legal
Hurdles, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at A5. Bonnie Campbell, director of the
Justice Department's newly created Office of Violence Against Women, ex-
plains, "People need to have the assurance that local police know when child
molesters and sex offenders are released." Id.
69. The Washington state legislature found that "sex offenders pose a
high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incar-
ceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is
a paramount governmental interest." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550
(West Supp. 1996) (quoting Historical and Statutory Notes); see supra note 7
(detailing New Jersey's legislative findings regarding recidivism).
During congressional debates urging the enactment of the 1994 Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Program,
several members of Congress argued that "allowing community notification
was crucial to preventing future crimes." Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 376
(N.J. 1995); see, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S12,544-45 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994)
(remarks of Sen. Lautenberg) (arguing that community notification is neces-
sary to protect the public); 140 CoNG. REc. H8,981-82 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(remarks of Rep. Ridge) (suggesting that notification provisions could have
saved Megan Kanka's life); 140 CONG. REC. S11,889-90 (daily ed. Aug. 16,
1994) (remarks of Senators Gorton and Lautenberg) (arguing community no-
tification is necessary to prevent repeat offenses); 140 CONG. REC. S10,710
(daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Gorton) (arguing that citizens have a
right to know of a sex offender's presence to prevent further victimization);
140 CONG. REC. H5612-17 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (remarks of Representa-
tives Dunn and Ramstad) (arguing that notification is needed to protect the
public).
70. John Sanko, Bill Aims to Unmask Sex Offenders, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Mar. 15, 1995, at 4A.
71. Jerry Seper, Reno Backs Notification Law, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1995, at A4; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (detailing recidivism
statistics used by the New Jersey legislature).
72. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996) (quoting His-
torical and Statutory Notes). Louisiana and New Jersey legislatures made
almost identical assertions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:540 (West Supp.
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the state's interest in protecting the public outweighed the pri-
vacy interests of sex offenders.73
Proponents of registration and notification laws argue that
increased public awareness and education of children should
lead to "more reporting of sex crimes and also help to detect
and deter repeat offenders." 74 A study of Washington's Com-
munity Protection Act75 concluded that although the law has
not reduced repeat offenses, "offenders who were subject to
community notification were arrested for new crimes much
more quickly than comparable offenders who were released
without notification."76
B. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Historically, public humiliation often accompanied physi-
cally painful punishments, thereby making them uniquely
harsh.77 Occasionally, punishments were rooted in shame
alone.78 The scarlet letter A Hester Prynne wore in Nathaniel
1996) (repeating the Washington legislature's statement); supra note 7 (de-
tailing the New Jersey legislature's findings).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996) (quoting His-
torical and Statutory Notes). This Comment does not analyze the privacy
challenges to Megan's Law. For a discussion of the privacy rights of sex of-
fenders, see Catherine A. Trinkle, Federal Standards for Sex Offender Regis-
tration: Public Disclosure Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 299, 314-19 (1995) (arguing that registration and notification laws must
be "narrowly tailored" to accomplish their remedial purpose to survive consti-
tutional challenges); Patricia L. Petrucelli, Comment, Megan's Law: Branding
the Sex Offender or Benefiting the Community?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
1127, 1158-69 (1995) (arguing that the community's right to be informed out-
weighs a sex offender's privacy interests). But cf Caroline Louise Lewis, The
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Reg-
istration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 91 (1996) (arguing
that an offender's privacy interest outweighs the community's right to know).
74. Criminal Law, supra note 66, at 787.
75. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy completed this
study. Eric Houston, Law Is Helping Police Track Sex Offenders, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 1995, at B2.
76. Id.
77. CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, THE ROOTS OF EvIL 27-28 (1963). Punishing
offenders in the public eye through hanging, flogging, and branding was com-
mon in early societies, including colonial America. HARRY ELMER BARNES,
THE STORY OF PuNISHMENT: A RECORD OF MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN 62
(1972). Colonial New Jersey practiced branding. Id. The hands of convicted
thieves, for example, were branded with the letter T. Id.
78. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1900-03, 1911-15 (1991) (describing the use and effects
of shame as punishment).
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Hawthorne's novel exemplifies the use of shame as punish-
ment.79 This use of shame was based on the belief that the
criminal committed wrongs against society, and society should
participate in punishing the offender.80
America's criminal justice system has not completely
eliminated "Scarlet Letter" style punishments,"1  despite
changes in the form of physical punishment.82 Creative judges
79. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 63-64 (1850).
But the point which drew all eyes, and as it were, transfigured the
wearer,-so that both men and women, who had been familiarly ac-
quainted with Hester Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld
her for the first time,--was that SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically
embroidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It had the effect of a
spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity, and in-
closing her in a sphere by herself.
Id.
80. BARNES, supra note 77, at 40. The belief that crimes are public of-
fenses and should be punished by all of society also underlies modem criminal
law. Id.
81. See Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1360-66
(arguing modem "Scarlet Letter" probation conditions constitute punishment
by humiliation).
82. As society evolved, the forms of punishment changed. HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9-16 (1968) (describing the
theories justifying punishment). Courts declared the pillories and stocks
"cruel and unusual punishment" and therefore unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893). Retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence, denunciation, and incapacitation became widely accepted justifi-
cations for punishment, and the American criminal justice system developed
elaborate rules and procedures for convicting and punishing wrongdoers.
PACKER, supra, at 37-58, 149-74.
The retribution theory of punishment holds that "it is right for the wicked
to be punished: because man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive
his just deserts." Id. at 37. Retributivist theorists believe that the criminal
pays society back and society obtains revenge against the criminal through
punishment. Id. at 38. Retributive theory also embraces the idea that indi-
viduals can expiate their sins through suffering punishment and making
amends to society. Id. Packer compares revenge and expiation theories:
The revenge theory treats all crimes as if they were certain crimes of
physical violence: you hurt X; we will hurt you. The expiation theory
treats all crimes as if they were financial transactions: you got some-
thing from X; you must give the equivalent value.
Id.
The rehabilitation theory is based on the belief that punishment will re-
form the individual so that he or she will not re-offend. Id. at 53. Packer
notes, however, that the effectiveness of rehabilitation is dubious because "we
do not know how to rehabilitate offenders, at least within the limit of the re-
sources that are now or might reasonably be expected to be devoted to the
task." Id. at 55.
Proponents of deterrence theory contend that punishment, either actual
1996]
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continue to impose "Scarlet Letter" penalties in a variety of
situations. Examples include requiring a convicted drunk
driver to place a "Convicted D.U.I. Restricted License" bumper
sticker on his car 83 and ordering a purse snatcher to wear tap
shoes.84 In each of these cases, the punisher's explicit, in-
tended purpose is to publicly humiliate the offender.
85
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION LAWS
Challengers to registration and notification laws claim
that these laws impose additional punishment,86 thus violating
the Ex Post Facto Clause,87 the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
or threatened, will inhibit those who are otherwise disposed to commit crimes.
Id. at 39. Alternatively, Jeremy Bentham's model of deterrence argues that
the purpose of punishment is to make the consequences of getting caught se-
vere enough, to outweigh any possible pleasure of successfully carrying out
the crime. Id. at 40-41.
The denunciation theory is premised on the belief that through punishing
law-breakers, the government sends the message to society that crime is
wrong and will not be tolerated. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 13 (1995).
The incapacitation theory is based on the premise that once someone has
committed a crime, they will likely re-offend. PACKER, supra, at 48-53. Thus,
incapacitation is necessary to protect the public and reduce crime. Id. Packer
notes, however, that predicting who will be a repeat offender is a difficult and
problematic task. Id. at 49-5 1.
83. See Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (per curiam). The defendant challenged the order on "cruel and unusual
punishment" grounds to no avail. Id. at 125-26. The court reasoned that
"[tjhe mere requirement that a defendant display a 'scarlet letter' as part of
his punishment is not necessarily offensive to the Constitution." Id. at 125.
But cf Donna DiGiovanni, Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation
That Failed, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643, 658-70 (1988) (analyzing Goldschmitt
and arguing that the bumper sticker is unconstitutional because it is exces-
sive and does not conform to the purposes of punishment).
84. See People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812-14 (1976), overruled
by People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802 (Cal. 1993) (requiring a purse snatcher to
wear tap shoes); see also Brilliant, supra note 81 at 1362-66 (describing mod-
ern day "Scarlet Letter" conditions).
85. Brilliant, supra note 81, at 1362-66.
86. See, e.g., State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc)
(holding that a registration requirement did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) (upholding registra-
tion of a sex offender against a claim that it imposed a disproportionate pen-
alty); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that a registration requirement is not punitive); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1068-69 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a registration requirement is not
an unconstitutional ex post facto law).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.").
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Unusual Punishment Clause,8 and the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause.8 9 Because these clauses only apply in
the criminal context, 0 the application of each clause hinges on
whether the challenged provision constitutes punishment.91
The Ex Post Facto Clause operates to invalidate a law that
"inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed."92 A law violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause if it is applied retrospectively93 and is punitive, rather
than regulatory.94 Most states apply registration and notifica-
tion laws retrospectively for offenses committed before the laws
came into effect.95 Thus, the critical inquiry in ex post facto
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
90. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (noting that some of
these constitutional protections only apply to criminal cases); see also
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause protects a criminal defendant from receiving two criminal pun-
ishments).
91. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (noting that validity of a challenged
provision depends on whether the penalty is civil or criminal); see Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 390 (N.J. 1995) (noting that "[tihe parties and all amici
are in general agreement that the laws' validity, measured against the various
constitutional attacks, depends on whether they inflict punishment").
92. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389-95 (1798) (holding retrospec-
tive application of Connecticut probate law did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause). The Supreme Court also stated that the purpose of the Ex Post
Facto Clause was "to protect... person[s] from punishment by legislative acts,
having a retrospective operation." Id.
93. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1990). A retrospective law
is one which "looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to
affect acts or facts occurring, or rights accruing, before it came into force."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
94. Collins, 497 U.S. at 42-43. Prior to the Collins decision, the Supreme
Court broadened the definition of ex post facto laws to include a law that
"alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." Kring v. Missouri, 107
U.S. 221, 235 (1882), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
Collins overruled Kring's expansive definition of ex post facto laws and rees-
tablished that the primary focus of an ex post facto inquiry is whether the law
constituted punishment. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Wash. 1994) (en
banc).
95. See State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 532 (N.H. 1994) ("The State does
not dispute that the law is retrospective as applied to the defendant."); Ward,
869 P.2d at 1068 (holding that Washington's sex offender registration statute
was retrospective in application). Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois and
Kansas do not apply their laws retrospectively. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,
428 (N.J. 1995).
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challenges to registration and notification laws is whether the
law is punitive or regulatory.96
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishment."97 A court hearing an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge must first decide whether the law constitutes punish-
ment.98 A law will violate the Eighth Amendment if it imposes
punishment that is disproportionate to the crime. To make
this determination, the court will consider: "(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (iii)
the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions."99
Evaluation of double jeopardy challenges also depends on
an initial determination of whether enforcement of the statute
constitutes punishment. °0 The Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
hibits the government from punishing an individual twice for
the same crime. 01 In cases where registration and notification
laws are challenged on all three grounds-ex post facto, cruel
and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy-courts often
decide the issue under the Ex Post Facto Clause rather than
evaluate the law under the Double Jeopardy Clause.'0 2 The
96. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910), the Supreme Court observed that cruel and unusual punishment
is a fluid concept that changes in accordance with societal values and norms.
The Court in Weems further reasoned that the determination of whether a law
is cruel and unusual should be based on the proportionality of the punishment
to the crime. Id. at 367.
98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (asserting that Eighth
Amendment challenges must involve a criminal sanction).
99. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). Although the Supreme
Court did not reject the Solem test outright, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 965 (1991), a plurality of the Court stated, "Solem was simply
wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee." Thus,
the future use of the proportionality test is unclear. In Artway v. Attorney
General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd, 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir.
1996), the court noted that after Harmelin, "clarity is now lacking as to the
proper application of Eighth Amendment scrutiny to legislation .... "
100. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 684 (noting that double jeopardy analysis
hinges on whether the statute and the burdens it creates effectively constitute
punishment).
101. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (quoting Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
102. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 405 (N.J. 1995) ("[B]ecause
the challenged provisions do not constitute punishment, they do not violate
any constitutional prohibition against punishment.").
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primary inquiry, then, is whether the challenged provision has
a punitive effect.
D. TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A LAW IS PUNITIVE
Courts do not agree on the legal standard for evaluating
whether state registration and notification laws have a puni-
tive effect;10 3 nor do they agree on whether laws determined to
be punitive nonetheless meet accepted constitutional man-
dates.1' The Supreme Court has not announced a definitive
test, applicable in all contexts, for determining whether a law
is punitive.105 Rather, the Court has developed a variety of
tests, the application of which depends on the nature of the
provision in question. 106 These tests differ in some respects,
but most involve inquiries into both the legislative purpose and
the ultimate effect of the statutory provision.
1. Trop v. Dulles and the "Legislative Purpose" Approach
In determining whether a law constitutes punishment, a
court must inquire into the law's underlying legislative in-
103. See discussion infra notes 142-155 (addressing various challenges to
registration and notification laws adopted throughout the United States).
104. Most courts addressing the issue have held that registration laws are
remedial and thus do not invoke ex post facto, double jeopardy and cruel and
unusual punishment protections. See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224
(Ariz. 1992); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Il. 1991); State v. Man-
ning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d
1062, 1069 (Wash. 1994). State courts in California and Louisiana, however,
deemed their state registration provisions punitive. See In re Reed, 663 P.2d
216, 220 (Cal. 1983) (en bane) (holding that requiring sex offenders convicted
of misdemeanor disorderly conduct to register constituted cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that registration violated the Ex Post Facto Clause). The Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp.
691, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), held that the notification provisions of Megan's Law
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Recently, the United States District Court
for New Jersey upheld both the registration and notification provisions of Me-
gan's Law. W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1223 (D.N.J. 1996).
105. See California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1603
(1995) ("We have previously declined to articulate a single 'formula' for identi-
fying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive
crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition... and we
have no occasion to do so here.").
106. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2144 (1996) (noting that
the test for determining whether a forfeiture is punitive differs from the test
applied in determining whether a penalty is punitive).
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tent.1 17  Where regulatory laws have punitive effects, the
"evident purpose of the legislature" will prevail.108 According to
the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles,0 9 a punitive statute
"imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment.""10 Re-
medial statutes, on the other hand, must serve a non-penal,
"legitimate governmental purpose."11'
The party claiming that a statute is punitive has the bur-
den of providing the clearest proof of the legislature's punitive
intent) 12 The Supreme Court defines "clearest proof' as "un-
mistakable evidence of punitive intent.""1 3 According to the Su-
preme Court, this strict quantum of proof will prevent lower
courts from guessing at the legislature's motives. 14 Conse-
quently, when the legislature's stated purpose is remedial,
"only the clearest proof" that the purpose is in fact punitive can
negate that intent) 1
2. The Development of the Halper Test
Expanding on its "legislative purpose" approach, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Salerno"6 formulated a test to
107. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (finding that revocation of citi-
zenship for military desertion constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
108. Id. at 96 ("The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some
adversity as a consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and a
nonpenal effect. The controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on
the evident purpose of the legislature."); see also De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144, 160 (1960). The Court in De Veau found:
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are
brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the
legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or
whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant
incident to a regulation of a present situation.
Id.
109. 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958).
110. Id. at 96.
111. Id.
112. Cf. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (quoting Fleming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)).
113. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960); see also Bae v. Shalala,
44 F.3d at 494 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has consistently required
'unmistakable evidence of punitive intent' to characterize a sanction as pun-
ishment .... ).
114. See Fleming, 363 U.S. at 617 ("Judicial inquiries into Congressional
motives are at best a hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go
behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious affair indeed .....
115. Ward, 448 U.S. at 24849.
116. 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
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determine whether a law or proceeding is punitive. 117  The
Court held that when the legislative purpose is unclear, a court
should consider whether an alternative non-penal purpose ra-
tionally related to the disputed provision exists, and whether
the law "appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned [to it]."" 8
Following Salerno, the Court in United States v. Halper,1
19
addressed the issue of whether the Civil False Claims Act,
which imposed monetary sanctions in addition to a criminal
conviction for the same false claims, violated the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 20 The Halper Court reasoned that "a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent
that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as re-
medial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 2' Conse-
quently, the Court found the monetary fine "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" to the non-penal legislative purpose of com-
pensating the government for its losses and concluded that the
fine could "only be explained as serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes."2 Accordingly, the Court held that the
civil penalties imposed under the Civil Claims Act were puni-
tive in nature. 23
In United States v. Ursery,24 the Supreme Court declined
to apply the Halper test in deciding whether a civil forfeiture
was punitive. 125 The Court reasoned that the "excessiveness"
117. Id.
118. Id. The Salerno majority held that pre-trial detention was not puni-
tive because its purpose, to protect society from potentially dangerous indi-
viduals, was regulatory. Id. at 748. Furthermore, the Court concluded that
"the incidents of pre-trial detention [are not] excessive in relation to the
regulatory goal." Id. at 747.
119. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
120. Id. at 448-49.
121 Id. at 449.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
125. Id. at 2144. The plaintiffs in Ursery argued that confiscating property
which was used to facilitate illegal drug transactions under 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6)-(7), in addition to their drug convictions, violated the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. Id. at 2137. The lower courts had interpreted Halper as holding
that civil forfeitures always constitute punishment for the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning the
Halper excessiveness determination relied on by the lower courts did not ap-
ply to civil forfeitures. Id. at 2144. The Court explained "for Double Jeopardy
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prong of the Halper test was difficult to apply and consequently
inappropriate when evaluating a civil forfeiture proceeding.
126
The Court instead used a two-part test derived from a line of
cases involving civil forfeiture proceedings.
27
In upholding the civil forfeiture claim as non-punitive,
128
Ursery does not render the Halper test useless outside the con-
text of civil penalties. 29 The Ursery Court acknowledges that
its decision does not mean that "there is no occasion for [the
Halper] analysis of the Government's harm .... The point is
simply that Halper's case-specific approach is inapplicable to
purposes we have never balanced the value of property forfeited in a particu-
lar case against the harm suffered by the Government in that case, we have
balanced the size of a particular civil penalty against the Government's
harm." Id. at 2145.
126. Id. The Court observed that civil penalties generally serve the pur-
pose of compensating the government for damages caused by the defendant's
conduct. Id. Thus, in evaluating the excessiveness of a penalty a court can
readily compare the penalty imposed to the amount of damages suffered by
the government. Id. Conversely, while the amount of a civil forfeiture can be
measured, the damages suffered by the government as a result of the illegal
use of the confiscated property are "virtually impossible to quantify." Id.
127. Id. at 2147. The Court followed United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (per curiam); and Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931).
The Court first looked at whether the forfeiture proceeding was punitive
or remedial. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. The Court noted that Congress in-
tended the civil forfeiture to be civil, rather than criminal. Id. Moreover, the
proceedings set up were civil and involved an action against property rather
than an individual person. Id. Second, the Court asked whether "clearest
proof' showed that the proceedings were "so punitive in form and effect as to
render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary." Id. at 2148.
The Court concluded that the forfeiture served the nonpunitive goal of en-
couraging property owners to be responsible and not allow their property to be
used for illegal purposes. Id.
128. Reversing the lower court decision, the Ursery Court held that the for-
feiture was not punitive and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
at 2149.
129. Id. at 2146. The court in W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1209 (D.N.J.
1996) observed that Ursery does not "require this court to relegate [Halper,
Austin, Kurth Ranch, (by implication) Morales] to a narrow context and
thereafter decline to consult them for guidance in deciding the case at bar."
Id. Ursery does mean, however, that the tests "cannot be employed to estab-
lish a 'synthesis' that generates a universal analytical framework for defining
punishment in all cases." Id. Consequently, the punishment test will vary
from case to case depending on the type of provision challenged.
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civil forfeitures."13 ° Hence, under Ursery courts should remain
flexible when making the punishment determination.
131
3. The Mendoza-Martinez Factors
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 the Supreme Court set
forth another approach for determining whether a law is puni-
tive in the absence of conclusive evidence of the legislative
purpose.3 3 The Court listed seven factors for courts to consider
in deciding whether a proceeding is civil or criminal. 1 3  These
factors include:
[11 [W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, [31 whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [41
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose for
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, [7] and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purposes
assigned. 35
The Court, however, did not apply any of these seven factors
when deciding the case. 13
6
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the use of the fac-
tors outside of the civil proceeding context,137 and despite con-
130. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146 (emphasis added).
13L See Poritz, 931 F. Supp. at 1209 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that Ursery
teaches that the punishment determination may not be "transformed into a
rigid series of hurdles which must be surmounted, one after the other, before
the legislation can survive an ex post facto or double jeopardy challenge").
132. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
133. Id. at 168-69. In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court held that provisions in
the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
which divest Americans of their citizenship for evading the draft, are uncon-
stitutional because they are punitive and fail to provide the procedural safe-
guards required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 186.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
136. Id. at 169.
Although we are convinced that application of these criteria to the
face of the statutes supports the conclusion that they are punitive, a
detailed examination along such lines is unnecessary, because the
objective manifestations of congressional purpose indicate conclu-
sively that the provisions in question can only be interpreted as pu-
nitive.
Id.
137. See Austin v. United States, 113 U.S. 2801, 2806 n.6 (1993) (rejecting
the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining whether punishment
was imposed for the purpose of applying the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) (rejecting
MEGAN'S LAW 52119961
522 MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 81:501
fusion over the appropriate weight to be given to the seven fac-
tors, 138 several courts have applied these factors when deter-
mining whether a particular registration or notification law is
punitive. 139 The Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York applied five of the seven Mendoza-Martinez
factors in overturning as punitive that state's version of Me-
gan's Law. 4 ° Similarly, the Supreme Court of California bal-
anced all seven of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to reach the
conclusion that the California registration law constituted
punishment when applied to misdemeanor sex offenses. 141
the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining whether a civil pen-
alty constitutes punishment for Double Jeopardy Clause purposes); see also
Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3rd Cir. 1996) (rejecting the appli-
cation of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to Megan's Law and noting that "[the]
Supreme Court has made clear that the Mendoza-Martinez test is not control-
ling for the issues in this case").
Furthermore, in United States v. Ursery, the Court observed that the
fourth and fifth factors were not dispositive in determining whether a civil
forfeiture was punitive. 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (D.N.J. 1996).
138. See discussion infra at notes 142-151 and accompanying text (ad-
dressing various challenges to the registration and notification laws that have
been adopted throughout the United States); see also Michele L. Earl-
Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Lib-
erty, Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter
Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 788, 819-26 (1996) (applying the Men-
doza-Martinez factors and concluding that Megan's Law is cruel and unusual
punishment); Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 885, 924-27 (1995) (same); Michael L.
Bell, Comment, Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Community Notification Law:
Will It Protect Communities from Repeat Sex Offenders?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 635,
659 (1996) (following the reasoning of district court's decision in Artway v. At-
torney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd, 81 F.3d
1235 (3rd Cir. 1996), which concludes that Pennsylvania's Megan's Law is
punishment based on application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
139. See infra notes 142-151 and accompanying text (addressing the ongo-
ing dialogue among courts and academics regarding the constitutionality of
Megan's Law).
140. Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 701-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In deeming
Megan's Law punitive, the Pataki court reasoned that "public notification of
one's crime has traditionally been viewed as punishment" (factor two); notifi-
cation serves a deterrent purpose, one of the traditional goals of punishment
(factor four); the stigma of notification results in an affirmative disability or
restraint on the offender (factor one); the provisions are "triggered by behav-
ior that is 'already a crime" (factor five); and the provisions accomplish their
remedial purpose so well that they become punitive (factor seven) in their
overall effect. Id.; cf State v. Afrika, Nos. 81/0787, 910293, 1996 WL 496672,
at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 1996) (upholding New York's Megan's Law and
finding the Pataki decision unpersuasive).
141. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 220 (Cal. 1983) (en bane). In Reed, the de-
fendant was convicted of "soliciting and dissolute conduct" from an undercover
vice officer in a public restroom. Id. at 216. The Reed court found that requir-
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State courts applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors in
Arizona,142 Washington, 43 and Minnesota l' reached the oppo-
site result. 4 The Arizona Supreme Court found Arizona's reg-
istration law non-punitive.14 6 The court explained that limited
access to and dissemination of information "significantly
dampen[ed] its stigmatic effect,"147 distinguishing the law from
"Scarlet Letter" shame punishments.14 ' The court also found
that the law served a legitimate regulatory purpose and had no
ing the defendant to register with local police would be disproportionate pun-
ishment in relation to his crime. Id. at 222. The court further noted that the
defendant "is not the prototype of one who poses a grave threat to society" and
that his "relatively simple indiscretion" does not "place him in the ranks of
those who commit more heinous registrable sex offenses." The court concluded
that requiring the defendant and similarly situated sex offenders convicted of
misdemeanor disorderly conduct to register violated the cruel and unusual
punishment provision of the California constitution. Id. at 221-22.
142. See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (upholding Ari-
zona's registration law).
143. See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1077 (Wash. 1994) (en banc). In
Ward, a convicted felony sex offender challenged the Washington Community
Protection Act on ex post facto grounds. Id. The Washington Supreme Court
began its analysis by observing that the Act was retrospectively applied to the
defendant. Id. at 1066. The court then applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors
to determine whether the act was punitive. The court concluded:
The Legislature's purpose was regulatory, not punitive; registration
does not affirmatively inhibit or restrain an offender's movements or
activities; registration per se is not traditionally deemed punishment;
nor does registration of sex offenders necessarily promote the tradi-
tional deterrent function of punishment. Although a registrant may
be burdened by registration, such burdens are an incident of the un-
derlying conviction and are not punitive for purposes of ex post facto
analysis.
Id. at 1074.
144. See State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(applying and holding that registration is remedial, and therefore constitu-
tional). Manning involved an ex post facto challenge to Minnesota's registra-
tion law, Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (Supp. 1993).
145. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (holding Arizona's registration
law is regulatory and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Manning,
532 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding Minnesota's registration
law is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Ward, 869
P.2d at 1077 (holding that Washington's registration law is not punitive and
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
146. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223-24. The Noble court did find, however, that
"registration has traditionally been viewed as punitive." Id. at 1222.
147. Id. at 1223. The Noble court further explained: "Registrants are not
forced to display a scarlet letter to the world; outside of a few regulatory ex-
ceptions, the information provided by sex offenders pursuant to the registra-
tion statute is kept confidential." Id. at 1223-24.
148. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
humiliation to punish criminals).
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excessive punitive effect when considered in relation to that
purpose. 49 The Arizona Supreme Court's decision influenced
subsequent decisions by the Washington 150 and Minnesota
courts. 151
Other state courts have ignored the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors altogether in deciding challenges to registration and noti-
fication laws) 52 Noting that the Mendoza-Martinez factors ap-
ply only where the legislative purpose is ambiguous, the
Illinois Supreme Court found the application of the factors to
Illinois registration law unnecessary where the legislative pur-
pose is "clearly nonpenal in nature."153 Instead, the court fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's "legislative purpose" approach from
Trop v. Dulles.14 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire up-
149. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223-24 (noting the purpose of registration is to
facilitate the police in locating child sex offenders, a purpose unrelated to
punishing offenders for past offenses).
150. See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (reject-
ing Noble's conclusion that, traditionally, registration has been viewed as pu-
nitive and stating, "[elven if a secondary effect of registration is to deter fu-
ture crimes in our communities, we decline to hold that such positive effects
are punitive in nature").
151. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota in State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d
244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) stated:
Consideration of the Mendoza-Martinez factors leads us to conclude
that the registration statute does not impose an affirmative disabil-
ity, has not historically been viewed as punishment, and does not ad-
vance the traditional aims of punishment. Although former offenders
may be slightly burdened by the fact that they could be scrutinized
when local sex crimes occur, we find that this additional burden is
not excessive in relation to the important regulatory purpose served.
Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248-49.
152. See Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641-42 (concluding that the application of
Mendoza-Martinez is unnecessary where the legislative purpose is regulatory
rather than punitive); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533-34 (N.H. 1994)
(holding the registration requirement "inflicts no greater punishment," and
does not violate ex post facto laws); State v. Taylor 835 P.2d 245, 246-49
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the legislative purpose was regulatory
and the punitive aspects were not so burdensome as to constitute an ex post
facto violation), review denied, 877 P.2d 695 (Wash. 1994).
153. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641. The defendant in Adams argued that the
Illinois Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 640. The Adams majority in dicta concluded that even if
registration was punitive, it would not qualify as "cruel and unusual." Id. at
641. The court, however, noted in dicta, that it might be inclined to strike
down a notification law under the Eighth Amendment because such laws may
impose a stigma on the offender. Id.
154. Id. at 640. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the "legislative purpose" test in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
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held its registration provisions by applying the Trop v. Dulles
test and finding "any punitive effect. . . to be de minumus."155
4. The Artway Test
Acknowledging the absence of a definitive test for making
the punishment determination, the Third Circuit in Artway v.
New Jersey'5 6 formulated its own three-prong test based on a
synthesis of prior court decisions.1 57 The elements of the three-
prong test are: actual purpose, objective purpose, and effects.' 58
Under the first prong, the court must determine whether the
legislature's actual purpose was punishment.'59 The second
prong poses three questions: (1) whether the law can be ex-
plained solely by a remedial purpose; (2) whether a historical
analysis showed that the measure had traditionally been re-
garded as punishment; and (3) whether any deterrent purpose
was a necessary complement to and did not overwhelm its
salutary remedial operation.1 60 Finally, the third prong ques-
tions whether the effects of the law are so harsh "as a matter of
155. State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533-34 (N.H. 1994). In Costello, the
defendant was charged with failing to register and challenged New Hamp-
shire's registration act on ex post facto grounds. Id. at 532. The Costello
court concluded that the registration requirement "inflict[ed] no greater pun-
ishment" than the original sentence and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Id. at 534.
156. 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3rd Cir. 1996).
157. Id.
158. The court took concepts from California Dep't of Corrections v. Mo-
rales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601-05 (1995); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945-46 (1994) (objective purpose and deterrence); Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617-23 (1993) (objective purpose through history);
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (objective purpose through
proportionality); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)
(the inquiry for the nature of proceedings); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
160 (1960) (subjective purpose). 81 F.3d at 1254-63.
The Artway court acknowledged that its test was "by no means perfect"
and that "[o]nly the Supreme Court knows where all the pieces belong." 81
F.3d at 1263.
159. 81 F.3d at 1264.
160. Id. at 1263; cf. Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Prin-
cipled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 1711, 1726 (1996) (proposing its own effects test: "[Ihf the sex offender
statute deprives an offender of an otherwise-established legal right and pri-
marily operates to affect retribution or general deterrence, it should be
deemed 'punitive' for constitutional purposes"). But see United States v. Urs-
ery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2146 (1996) (noting that a remedial law may also have
deterrent objectives without becoming punitive).
1996]
526 MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 81:501
degree" as to become punishment. 6' Applying this synthesized
test, the Third Circuit upheld the registration provisions of
Megan's Law.16
2
Using the Artway test, the New Jersey Federal District
Court recently upheld the registration and notification provi-
sions of Megan's Law. 63 Although the court found that the
Artway test was inconsistent with Ursery, which rejected the
formulation of a "universal" test'64 and was not binding, 165 the
161. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1266; cf Artway v. New Jersey, 83 F.3d 594, 596-
98 (3rd Cir. 1996) (denial of rehearing) (Alito, J. dissenting) (arguing that
Artway's effects test is not supported by Supreme Court precedent). Alito
explained that Artway misinterpreted California Dep't of Corrections v. Mo-
rales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 (1995), a case which never addressed the issue of
whether a provision was punishment. Artway, 83 F.3d at 597. Alito also ob-
served that certain governmental actions such as pretrial detention, profes-
sional license revocation and deportation, which have harsh effects, have been
upheld as nonpunitive. Id. at 596.
162. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267. Applying its test, the Artway court concluded
that the actual and objective purpose of registration was remedial. Id. at
1264-65. The court further reasoned that the effects of registration were not
harsh enough to constitute punishment. Id. at 1267.
The court found that Artway's challenge to notification was not ripe for
review because the plaintiffs tier determination had not been made. Id. at
1248. Thus, the court did not determine whether notification was punitive.
Id. In dicta, however, the court indicated that it might find notification puni-
tive because of the harshness of ostracism and vigilante reprisals and its re-
semblance to shaming punishment. Id. at 1265-66.
163. W.P.v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1223 (D.N.J. 1996).
164. Id. at 1208; see Artway v. New Jersey, 83 F.3d 594, 598 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(denial of rehearing) (Alito, J. dissenting) (arguing that Morales is a "narrow
decision" and should not be read "as adopting a universally applicable effects
test").
The district court in Poritz observed that "Ursery casts considerable doubt
upon whether a separate effects hurdle must be scaled in order for Megan's
Law to withstand the present constitutional attack, Ursery itself suggests that
both purpose and effect are considerations in an ex post facto or double jeop-
ardy analysis." 931 F. Supp. at 1218. The court further observed that Artway
misinterpreted Morales for the effects portion of its test. Id. Morales, the
court explained, did not even involve the issue of whether a provision consti-
tuted punishment. Id. The question in Morales was whether a provision
which decreased a prisoner's entitlement to parole eligibility hearings im-
permissibly increased the punishment attached to criminal conduct. 115 S. Ct.
1597, 1599 (1995).
The Morales Court held that a law that changed the procedure for de-
termining a parole release date did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause be-
cause it created only a "speculative and attenuated possibility of producing
the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered
crimes, and such conjectural effects are insufficient under any threshold we
might establish under the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 1603. The Morales
Court reasoned that in an ex post facto challenge the focus should not be on
court proceeded to apply the Artway test to uphold Megan's
Law.166
11. DOE V. PORITZ
In Doe v. Poritz,167 the New Jersey Supreme Court formu-
lated a two-step test for determining whether a registration or
notification law is regulatory or punitive. 16 In arriving at this
test, the court followed the Supreme Court's "legislative pur-
pose" approach as established in Trop v. Dulles 69 and ex-
panded by United States v. Salerno70 and United States v.
Halper 7 1 Under the Poritz test, a court must first determine if
whether the law "produces some ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage.'" Id. at
1602 n.3.
165. The court concluded that "the particular, compartmentalized ap-
proach of Artway need not and should not be followed, because it is not bind-
ing precedent for the issues and claims presented in the cross motions for
summary judgment." 931 F. Supp. at 1208.
166. Id. at 1213-19. The court began its analysis by concluding that the
actual intent of Megan's Law was remedial. Id. at 1213. Next, the court rea-
soned that the objective purpose was remedial. Id. at 1214. The court ex-
plained that "the deterrent purpose of... the law is a necessary complement
to its salutory [remedial] operation." Id. (quoting Artway v. Attorney General
of New Jersey, 81 F.3d at 1263). Moreover, the court stated, "[Tlhe means
employed (Tier II and EI notifications) are directly proportional to the ends
which Megan's Law is designed to serve." Id.
The court then proceeded to distinguish Megan's Law from "Scarlet Let-
ter" style punishment. Id. at 1215-16. The court reasoned that unlike "Scarlet
Letter" punishments which were intended to publicly humiliate criminals,
Megan's Law is designed to protect children, and the resulting impact is
merely a consequence of accomplishing the remedial purpose. Id. at 1217.
The court further compared Megan's Law to the FBrs most wanted lists, ex-
plaining that law enforcement officials have used wanted posters since the
beginning of the republic and they have never been considered "punitive." Id.
Thus, the court reasoned that a historical analysis reveals that Megan's Law
is remedial. Id. at 1218.
Although the court had reservations about the validity of the effects test,
the court did not hesitate to apply it because it demonstrated that Megan's
Law was not punitive. Id. at 1219. The court explained that notification was
no more severe than other remedial measures such as deportation or pretrial
detention. Id.
167. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
168. Id..at 390, 404-05.
169. 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text
(discussing the Trop v. Dulles "legislative purpose" test).
170. 481 U.S. 739 (1987); see supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text
(discussing Salerno's expansion of the legislative purpose test).
171. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, the Supreme Court stated that "a
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment." Id. at 448. The Poritz majority concluded that the
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the legislative intent is regulatory or punitive. 2 If the legis-
lative intent is punitive, the inquiry ends, because punishment
results."3 If the legislative intent is regulatory, a court must
assess whether the implementing provisions are "excessive" in
that they are not necessary to accomplish the regulatory pur-
pose. 4 Under the second step, any punitive impact which is
not an "inevitable consequence" of the regulatory provision will
render a provision punitive.17 5
Concluding that other courts have mistakenly applied the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to registration and notification pro-
visions,176 the Poritz court refused to use the Mendoza-
Halper language was not intended to apply to provisions which serve solely
remedial purposes, only to provisions that do not advance a remedial purpose
and therefore only serve punitive purposes. 662 A.2d at 394. The Poritz ma-
jority further reasoned that the term "serve" refers to the "purpose" of the
provision and not the "impact" because "the use of the word "explained"
clearly suggests an examination of something more than the impact; it sug-
gests the question of whether the impact is simply an inevitable consequence
of the remedial provision, or whether it is such that the only explanation is
another purpose to the sanction, a punitive purpose." Id. Thus, the majority
concluded, "[w]hat counts.., is the purpose and design of the statutory pro-
vision, its remedial goal and purposes, and not the resulting consequential
impact, the 'sting of punishment' that may inevitably, but incidentally flow
from it." Id. at 396.
172. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 390.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Poritz court explained:
The law is characterized as punitive only if the punitive impact comes
from aspects of the law unnecessary to accomplish its regulatory pur-
poses-that is, if the law is "excessive," the excess consisting of pro-
visions that cannot be justified as regulatory, that result in a punitive
impact, and that, therefore, can only be explained as evidencing a
punitive intent.
Id. at 390-91. The court further observed that this inquiry reflects "the under-
lying constitutional goal of preventing government from using its power to
punish either in an excessive or unjust manner." Id. at 398.
175. Id. at 390. The court explained:
[Tihe ultimate question is whether this statute.., is an impermissi-
ble use of government's power to punish, or whether it is an honest,
rational exercise of the government's power, aimed solely at effecting
a remedy, its provisions explainable as addressed to that which is
being remedied, its deterrent or punitive impact, if any, a necessary
consequence of its remedial provisions.
Id. at 398.
176. Id. at 400-01. The Poritz majority noted:
One might wonder of the importance of Mendoza-Martinez as a "test"
when the two most important cases to which it has been applied,
Mendoza-Martinez and Ward, have treated it so cavelierly, Mendoza-
Martinez, the originator, not using it at all, and Ward considering but
one factor and dismissing it as unpersuasive.
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Martinez factors in its analysis.177 The court observed that the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the use of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors outside of the context of determining whether
a proceeding is civil or criminal in Halper178 and United States
v. Austin.17 9 Moreover, the Mendoza-Martinez decision itself
indicated that the Court only intended the factors to be used as
a guide in cases where conclusive evidence of the legislative
purpose was unavailable. 8 0 The Poritz court reasoned that use
of the factors as determinative indicators distracted the review-
ing court from thoroughly analyzing the issues of the case.18 1
The court also noted that several cases following Mendoza-
Martinez applied only the last two factors which constitute the
Halper test.8 2 The majority thus concluded that the factors
should not be used to determine whether a particular law im-
poses punishment. 13
Applying its own test to Megan's Law, the Poritz majority
found that the legislative intent, to protect the public from re-
peat offenders, was regulatory184 and that the implementing
177. Id.
178. 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
179. 662 A.2d at 402-03; see supra note 137 and accompanying text
(discussing the rejection of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 447 (1989)).
Based on these precedents, the Poritz majority argued that courts should
not apply the Mendoza-Martinez factors in ex post facto and cruel and un-
usual punishment cases because punishment in those contexts is "sub-
stantially indistinguishable from punishment in the double jeopardy and ex-
cessive fines context." 662 A.2d at 402.
180. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 401 (The description of Mendoza-Martinez as
providing factors that are 'useful guideposts' is a far cry from the status they
are given in recent cases as the determinative test.").
181. Id. at 403. The court concluded that determinative use of the factors
could have the "practical effect of distracting a court from a significant analy-
sis of the issues." Id.
182. Id. at 401 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-51 (1987);
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269-72 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
537-39 (1979).
183. Id. at 402.
184. Id. at 404 (stating that the legislative purpose was "to enable the
public to protect itself from the danger posed by sex offenders.., widely re-
garded as having the highest risk of recidivism"). As evidence of remedial in-
tent the court noted that the law applies only to those offenders who are most
likely to re-offend. Id. Further, the law applies to individuals regardless of
culpability, including those found not guilty by reason of insanity, indicating
that the purpose is remedial, not punitive. Id. The court further concluded:
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provisions were "not excessive, but... aimed solely at achiev-
ing, and, in fact . . . [were] likely to achieve, that regulatory
purpose."185 In so holding, the court observed that the legisla-
ture relied on recidivism statistics,186 evidence showing that
successful treatment is rare,1 87 and studies revealing the harm-
ful effects on victims, especially children.'88 The court con-
cluded that Megan's Law reflected a legislative choice 89 as to
how to remedy these problems, 190 not an attempt to punish sex
offenders further. 191
The Registration and Notification Laws are not retributive laws, but
laws designed to give people a chance to protect themselves and their
children. They do not represent the slightest departure from our
State's or our country's fundamental belief that criminals, convicted
and punished, have paid their debt to society and are not to be pun-
ished further.
Id. at 372.
185. Id. at 405. The Poritz majority found that the means chosen, the
Tiers, were "strongly related to the risk of re-offense and the consequent need
for greater or lesser notification." Id. The Poritz majority further reasoned
that removing the "shield of anonymity" from sex offenders is an unavoidable
consequence of a registration and notification law, because informing the
public "goes to the very heart of the remedy: that which is allegedly punitive,
the knowledge of the offender's record and identity, is precisely that which is
needed for the protection of the public." Id.
186. Id. at 374-75; see supra note 7 (discussing the recidivism statistics
cited by the Poritz court).
187. Id. at 374.
188. 662 A.2d at 374-75; see supra note 64 (discussing the harmful effects
of sex crimes on children).
189. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 373. The court explained:
The choice the Legislature made was difficult, for at stake was the
continued apparently normal lifestyle of previously-convicted sex of-
fenders, some of whom were doing no harm and very well might
never do any harm, as weighed against the potential molestation,
rape, or murder by others of women and children because they simply
did not know of the presence of such a person and therefore did not
take the common-sense steps that might prevent such an occurrence.
The Legislature chose to risk unfairness to the previously-convicted
offenders rather than unfairness to children and women who might
suffer because of their ignorance, but attempted to restrict the dam-
age that notification of the public might do to the lives of rehabili-
tated offenders by trying to identify those most likely to re-offend and
limiting the extent of notification based on that conclusion.
Id.
190. Id. at 376. The court observed:
The remedy goes directly to the question of what a community can do
to protect itself against the potential of re-offense by a group the
Legislature could find had a relatively high risk of recidivism involv-
ing those crimes to which the most vulnerable and defenseless were
exposed-the children of society.
Id.
191. Id. at 373.
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The Poritz majority emphasized that legislative intent is
not the sole determinant of punishment. 9 2 The court reasoned
that its analysis considered the functional effect of the law. 93
The court explained that the punitive effects of Megan's Law
do not transform it into punishment because those effects are
"an inevitable consequence of the regulatory provision,"194
rather than "excessive" provisions, that do not advance the
regulatory purpose.' 95 Accordingly, the court found that Me-
gan's Law was not punitive. 96
Having determined that Megan's Law was not punitive,
the Poritz court held that Megan's Law did not violate the Ex
192. 662 A.2d at 404. Justice Stein, the sole dissenter in Poritz, criticized
the majority for relying solely on legislative intent. Id. at 432. Stein reasoned
that Halper required the court to look not only at legislative intent, but also at
the effects of the law, including whether the actual function of the law im-
poses punishment. Id. at 435-36. Stein concluded that, functionally, the'law
imposed punishment because its effects were consistent with historical forms
of punishment such as stigma and public humiliation. Id. at 437-38. Stein
noted that Megan's Law led to two incidents of vigilantism. Id. at 430. The
first incident involved notification following the release of a convicted rapist in
Phillipsburg, New Jersey in which local police provided the residents of the
community with the sex offender's address and a photograph of him. Id. A
father and son went to the offender's address and assaulted the man they be-
lieved to be the released sex offender. Id. They attacked the wrong man. Id.
The second incident involved a sex offender who got a preliminary injunction
to delay notification. Id. Upon discovery of the injunction, the Guardian An-
gels organized a demonstration outside the house of the released offender's
mother. Id. The demonstrators carried signs with photos of the released of-
fender and a number to call if the offender was seen. Id. Based on these inci-
dents, Stein found that Megan's Law adversely affected the quality of sex of-
fenders' lives, thus imposing additional punishment in violation of ex post
facto laws. Id. at 441; see also Lori N. Sabin, Note, Doe v. Poritz: A Constitu-
tional Yield to an Angry Society, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 331, 354 (1996) (arguing
that Megan's Law "should be declared an increase in punishment because Doe
will likely be subject to constant community harassment, endangered with the
possibility of vigilante attacks, and burdened with the probability of losing his
current job and remaining unemployable").
193. 662 A.2d at 404-05. The Poritz majority observed that some harass-
ment and vigilantism may result. Id. at 376-77. Yet, the court refused to as-
sume that such harassment and vigilantism would convert Megan's Law into
punishment. Id. The court assumed that the public and media would act re-
sponsibly. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the Attorney General had
"strongly warned that vigilantism and harassment will not be tolerated." Id.
at 376.
194. Id. at 405. The court found that "[t~he notification provisions are as
carefully tailored as one could expect in order to perform their remedial func-
tion without excessively intruding on the anonymity of the offender." Id. at
404.
195. Id. at 405.
196. Id. at 367.
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Post Facto Clause, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or
the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 97 The court also revised portions
of the Attorney General's Guidelines that set forth the terms of
tier classifications to conform them to its interpretation of the
statute. 9 The court further established procedural safe-
guards, in compliance with the procedural Due Process
Clause, 99 restricting the discretion of law enforcement in
making notification decisions.2 °°
III. CHARTING A NEW COURSE: PORITZ'S TEST OUT-
PERFORMS THE REST
Doe v. Poritz sets forth the most appropriate test for de-
termining whether registration and notification laws are puni-
tive. Tests followed by other courts are not supported by prece-
dent, improperly balance purpose and effects and lead to
circuitous reasoning and inconsistent results. In contrast, the
Poritz test conforms to the major trends in caselaw regarding
punishment determinations and properly balances purpose
and effects. The test also encourages legislatures to draft nar-
rowly tailored provisions that minimize the negative impact on
sex offenders. Finally, the Poritz test appropriately considers
policy justifications behind registration and notification laws
by weighing the need to protect the public against the adverse
effects on a sex offender.
A. PORITZ PROVIDES A BETTER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK THAN
OTHER EXISTING TESTS
1. Rejecting the Mendoza-Martinez Factors
The major distinction between the various court decisions
considering challenges to registration and notification laws is
197. Id. at 405.
198. Id. at 381-86; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the three tiers of notification). The Poritz court revised and limited the
second tier to include only those women's and children's organizations "likely
to encounter" the offender, not all such organizations. 662 A.2d at 381.
Similarly, the court limited the third tier to notification of those "likely to en-
counter" the offender, not the entire community. Id.
In response to Poritz, New Jersey's Attorney General established a "Sex
Offender Risk Assessment Scale" used by county prosecutors in assigning tier
levels to individual offenders. Id.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
200. 662 A.2d at 417.
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the court's willingness to apply the Mendoza-Martinez factors
to determine whether a law is punitive."' Criticizing courts for
using the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 2 the Poritz court points
out that even the Mendoza-Martinez court did not apply the
factors in deciding the case.0 3 The Poritz court correctly con-
cluded that using the factors as a determinative test, rather
than as a helpful guideline, is inconsistent with the language
of Mendoza-Martinez.2°
Using the factors as a balancing test is unworkable be-
cause the factors "may often point in differing directions."20 5
For instance, a law may have a deterrent effect, thereby satis-
fying the fourth factor 206 and suggesting that the law is puni-
tive. The same law, however, may not be excessive in relation
to accomplishing its regulatory purpose, failing to meet the
seventh factor and suggesting that the law is not punitive. °7
Similarly, in a different case, application of four of the factors
may suggest a law is punitive whereas the other three factors
suggest the opposite conclusion.2 8 In both cases, a court must
decide which factors should be given the most weight, while ig-
noring the other factors. 2 9 The court deciding the case is dis-
tracted from engaging in good legal reasoning by trying to rec-
oncile the inconsistencies of applying the test.210 Hence, as
201. See supra notes 139-155 and accompanying text (detailing constitu-
tional challenges to registration and notification laws).
202. See supra notes 176-183 and accompanying text (discussing Poritz's
criticism of the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
203. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining that the Men-
doza-Martinez Court did not rely on the Mendoza-Martinez factors in its deci-
sion).
204. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-70 (1963).
205. Id. at 169.
206. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (listing the Mendoza-
Martinez factors).
207. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (listing the Mendoza-
Martinez factors).
208. A court may then ask whether four factors are enough to make it pu-
nitive or whether five, six or all seven factors are necessary to deem a law
punitive. Alternatively, a court could decide that the three factors suggesting
the law is regulatory should be controlling because they are more important.
Thus, applying the factors does not really help a court reach the best decision,
because the court must use its own judgment to determine which of the fac-
tors should get the most weight, if any at all.
209. See supra notes 176-183 and accompanying text (detailing Poritz's
criticism of the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
210. See supra notes 176-183 and accompanying text (detailing Poritz's
criticism of the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
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Poritz suggested, attempting to weigh and balance the differ-
ent factors leads courts to circuitous reasoning and inconsis-
tent results.2 '
Poritz's rejection of the Mendoza-Martinez factors follows
the reasoning of other courts. Both Halper and Austin rejected
the use of the factors for determining whether a law is punitive
and limited the application of the factors to the context of de-
termining whether a proceeding is civil or criminal.212 The Su-
preme Court in Ursery further indicated that two of the Men-
doza-Martinez factors should not be determinative of whether a
law is punitive.213 The Court reasoned that all laws that serve
deterrent purposes, the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, are
not necessarily punitive:214 "We long have held that this pur-
pose may serve civil as well as criminal goals."215 Similarly,
the Court rejected the third Mendoza-Martinez factor, noting
that the fact that a law is tied to criminal activity "is far from
the 'clearest proof necessary to show that a proceeding is
criminal."216  Consequently, application of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors to determine whether Megan's Law is puni-
tive conflicts with Ursery.
2. Artway: Overemphasizing Effects
Artway's three-prong test has similar shortcomings. The
test is difficult to apply because it contains several hoops that
laws must jump through.217 Like the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
211. Using the factors as a test in practice actually gives courts consider-
able freedom in deciding the case because they can pick and choose which fac-
tors they think are most compelling and ignore the rest. See supra notes 176-
183 and accompanying text (detailing Poritz's criticism of the use of the Men-
doza-Martinez factors).
212. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of
Mendoza-Martinez in Halper and Austin).
213. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Ursery's rejec-
tion of the fourth and fifth factor).
214. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Ursery's rejec-
tion of the fourth and fifth factors).
215. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996); see supra note
137 and accompanying text (discussing Ursery's rejection of the fourth factor).
216. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149; see supra note 137 and accompanying text
(discussing Ursery's rejection of the fifth factor).
217. See supra note 131 (noting that tests should not create a series of
hurdles). Moreover, some of the hoops are substantively improper. The part
of the second prong which focuses on deterrence, like the second Mendoza-
Martinez factor, is inconsistent with Ursery. See supra note 137 and accom-
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tors, the three prongs of the Artway test may suggest opposite
conclusions.21' For example, the actual and objective purpose
of a law may be remedial, but the effects may be severe enough
to suggest the law is punitive.219 Thus, a court following Art-
way must decide which prongs should control and which
prongs should be disregarded.no
The third prong, which focuses on the effects of a provi-
sion, is the most problematic. 221 The Artway court concluded
that if the effects of a remedial provision are severe enough,
that provision is punitive.222 Yet, the Supreme Court has never
held that severe effects alone transform an otherwise remedial
provision into punishment.3 Indeed, the Court has upheld
harsh effects such as pretrial detention and deportation as re-
medial actions.n 4 Furthermore, Artway mistakenly relied on a
case that did not even involve the issue of whether a law was
punitive to reach this conclusion.2 The case Artway relied on
involved the issue of whether a law increased the punishment
attached to a crime in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 226
The "effects" analysis in this context thus examines whether
the effects of the new provision increased the punishment, not
whether the provision was punitive.227
panying text (explaining that the Supreme Court in Ursery found the deter-
rence factor nondispositive).
218. The second prong of the test actually consists of three of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, thus raising the same concerns presented by those factors.
See supra notes 205-211 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the
Mendoza-Martinez factors).
219. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text (describing the Art-
way test).
220. Cf. supra notes 205-211 and accompanying text (discussing similar
problems with the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
221. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting problems with the
validity of the effects prong).
222. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing Artway's mis-
interpretation of Morales in concluding that effects alone can make a law pu-
nitive).
223. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (criticizing the effects
prong).
224. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (explaining that pretrial
detention and deportation have been upheld as remedial actions despite their
severe effects).
225. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (detailing the holding
in Morales).
226. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (detailing the issue in
Morales).
227. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (explaining the refer-
ence to effects in Morales).
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In addition, Artway's synthesis of the "punitive determi-
nation" tests conflicts with Ursery's case-specific approach.228
The Ursery Court reasoned that courts should follow different
punishment tests depending on the type of provision chal-
lenged.2 29 The Ursery Court properly observed that the test
used for assessing a civil penalty is not appropriate for deter-
mining whether a civil forfeiture is punitive.20 Thus, Artway's
attempt to lump all the different tests used in various contexts
together into one definitive test is improper and should not be
followed.23'
3. Trop v. Dulles's "Legislative Purpose" Test: Improperly
Allowing Remedial Purpose to Trump Punitive Effects
The Trop v. Dulles test applied by the supreme courts of
Illinois 232 and New Hampshire233 in upholding their respective
registration laws is also problematic.234 It places too much em-
phasis on legislative purpose. If the statute has punitive ef-
fects, but the legitimate government purpose is remedial, that
remedial purpose governs.235 Although the test requires the
court to evaluate the legitimacy of the legislative purpose by
evaluating the effects of the statute, it nonetheless suggests
that a court may ignore punitive effects if the purpose is
deemed remedial.236 Hence, application of the Trop v. Dulles
test leads to misguided conclusions because it allows a reme-
dial legislative purpose to trump any punitive effects.
228. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that "the tests
cannot be employed to establish a 'synthesis'" and courts should consider the
context of each case in deciding which test to follow).
229. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that the pun-
ishment test followed will vary from case to case).
230. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining that the differ-
ences between civil penalties and civil forfeitures warrant the use of different
tests when determining whether a penalty or forfeiture is punitive).
231. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that courts
should consider the context of each case in deciding which test to follow).
232. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (discussing People v.
Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Ill. 1991)).
233. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Cos-
tello, 643 A.2d 531 (N.H. 1994)).
234. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (detailing the
"legislative purpose" test).
235. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)).
236. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing Trop, 356
U.S. at 96).
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B. THE PoRITZ TEST APPROPRIATELY BALANCES PURPOSE AND
EFFECTS
Of the different tests used by courts, the Poritz test pro-
vides the most straightforward standard for determining
whether a law is punitive.2 37 Unlike the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors and the Artway test, the Poritz test does not require courts
to pick and choose among conflicting factors or prongs.
2 38
Courts applying Poritz must simply inquire into the legislative
purpose of the provision and then determine whether the im-
plementing provisions are excessive in accomplishing that pur-
pose.239
1. Substantive Support for the Poritz Test
The Poritz test is consistent with the major trends in
caselaw regarding punishment determinations. Poritz cor-
rectly observed that courts applying the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors to cases outside the context of challenges to registration
and notification laws use only the last two factors,24 ° which
mirror the language of the Halper test.241 The majority opinion
and dissenting opinion in Poritz disagreed about the outcome
of applying Halper, but their assessments of the test's elements
were consistent.242 Both the majority and dissent reasoned
that Halper required courts to ask two questions: (1) what is
the legislative purpose, and (2) are the effects of the law exces-
sive in relation to accomplishing that purpose?2 43
237. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (discussing the re-
quirements of the Halper test as set forth in Poritz).
238. See supra notes 205-211 and accompanying text (analyzing consis-
tency problems with applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors) and notes 217-
220 and accompanying text (analyzing consistency problems with the Artway
test).
239. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text .(detailing the two
prongs of the Halper test as set forth in Poritz).
240. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (listing the Mendoza-
Martinez factors).
241. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (detailing the two
prongs of the Halper test as set forth in Poritz).
242. See supra notes 171-174, 192 and accompanying text (describing the
majority opinion and dissenting opinion's interpretations of Halper and the
majority's conclusion that Megan's Law is remedial and the dissent's conclu-
sidn that Megan's Law is punitive).
243. See supra notes 171-174, 192 and accompanying text.
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Applying Poritz's interpretation of the Halper test to Me-
gan's Law does not conflict with Ursery.2" The Ursery Court
declined to apply Halper because it distinguished between the
purposes of civil penalties and civil forfeitures.24 The Ursery
court concluded that Halper's "excessiveness determination"
was not workable within the context of civil forfeitures. 246 On
the contrary, courts can apply the "excessiveness determina-
tion" to registration and notification laws. Furthermore, most
notification statutes,24 including Megan's Law248 and the Fed-
eral Act,249 contain language permitting or mandating disclo-
sure as "necessary to protect the public."25 ' Similar to the
"excessiveness determination" in Halper, in which the Court
concluded that the penalty imposed grossly exceeded the harm
to the government,25' notification laws may be evaluated to de-
termine whether the scope of notification exceeds what is
"necessary to protect the public."25 2
The Poritz test also follows the "clearest proof' require-
ment. 3 The "clearest proof" requirement prevents a court
from deferring entirely to either the statute's purpose or effects
in its analysis. It ensures that courts will require
"unmistakable evidence of punitive intent" before rejecting the
remedial purpose offered by the legislature.254 Similarly, under
244. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining Ursery does
not mean that Halper cannot be applied outside the context of civil penalties,
only that courts should engage in case-specific analysis).
245. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
Ursery did not apply the Halper test).
246. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining why Ursery
held that Halper's excessiveness determination did not apply to civil forfei-
tures).
247. See supra note 8 (explaining that Washington's Community Protec-
tion Act authorizes release when necessary to protect public safety).
248. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that New Jer-
sey's Megan's Law mandates disclosure as "necessary for the public safety").
249. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (stating that SVORA man-
dates notification where "necessary to protect the public").
250. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that New Jer-
sey's Megan's Law mandates disclosure as "necessary for the public safety").
251. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text (describing the
Court's reasoning in Halper).
252. See infra text accompanying notes 259-264 (describing how the ex-
cessiveness determination can be used to evaluate registration and notifica-
tion laws).
253. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing the
"clearest proof' test).
254. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
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the second step of the Poritz test a challenger must prove that
a law exceeds its remedial purpose in order for the law to be
deemed punitive. Thus, the Poritz test properly incorporates
the "clearest proof' requirement.
2. The Poritz Test Outperforms the Rest
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of the con-
stitutionality of registration and notification laws. Courts
must look to other areas of law in which courts have deter-
mined if a provision was punitive. The Poritz test is based on
tests developed in response to challenges to laws other than
registration and notification provisions. Unlike the other pro-
posed tests, the Poritz test ensures a proper balance between
purpose and effects. Likewise, courts using the Poritz test will
strike down provisions whose punitive effects exceed what is
necessary to accomplish the remedial purpose. 5 For these
policy reasons, the Supreme Court should follow Poritz's lead
and apply the Poritz test to Megan's Law.
By requiring courts to examine not only the legislative
purpose underlying a statute, but also whether the effects of
the provision go beyond its purported purpose, Poritz encour-
ages courts to engage in well-reasoned analysis." 6 If properly
applied, Poritz discourages courts from relying entirely on ei-
ther the legislative purpose 25 or effects258 Rather, Poritz re-
quires courts to look beyond the legislative purpose and de-
termine whether the statute as implemented is excessive in
relation to accomplishing its purpose.259
The Poritz test also encourages state legislatures to draft
their registration and notification laws in ways that minimize
255. See infra notes 259-264 and accompanying text (describing how the
excessiveness determination can be used to evaluate registration and notifi-
cation laws).
256. See supra notes 167-200 and accompanying text (discussing the Poritz
test analysis).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 232-236 (discussing the problems
with the "legislative purpose" test in Trop v. Dulles). The second prong of the
Poritz test, requiring courts to determine if the provisions as implemented go
beyond the regulatory purpose, avoids the Dulles court's problem of deferring
to legislative purpose. See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text
(detailing the Poritz test).
258. See supra note 192 (discussing the Poritz dissent's reliance on puni-
tive effects such as stigma and humiliation).
259. See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text (discussing the Poritz
test as requiring analysis of both the purpose of the provision and the effects
of implementation).
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the punitive effects. Courts could use the second prong of
Poritz, which examines whether the implementing provisions
are excessive in relation to the regulatory purpose, to strike
down provisions that are not narrowly drawn.20 For instance,
a provision that enables law enforcement to notify the entire
community when any sex offender is released without any as-
sessment of the risk imposed by that particular offender would
fail the second prong of Poritz, because the provision goes be-
yond what is necessary to achieve its remedial purpose.26'
Similarly, broadly drawn statutes like Washington's Commu-
nity Protection Act,262 that do not contain specific risk assess-
ment guidelines, would fail the Poritz test.263 Furthermore, a
statute requiring sex offenders to wear specially labeled cloth-
ing would be struck down as excessive in achieving its regula-
tory purpose.2
Ultimately, the question of whether Megan's Law should
be upheld rests on these policy considerations. With the intro-
duction of registration and notification laws, society must bal-
ance the rights of sex offenders against the rights of potential
victims. The community's right to know must be balanced
against a sex offender's right to be free from unconstitutional
stigmatization. The need to protect children from the threat
posed by sex offenders must be balanced against the intrusion
in offenders' lives.
Notification will undoubtedly adversely affect the lives of
sex offenders. Offenders will not be able to reintegrate into a
community without others knowing of their criminal history. If
they could, the purpose of Megan's Law would be defeated.
The heart of Megan's Law is that it provides parents with the
opportunity to protect their children from a known sex offender
and teach them how to respond to invitations from strangers.265
The recidivism statistics reveal that sex offenders pose a real
threat to society;266 sex offenders commit repeat offenses more
260. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text (discussing the sec-
ond prong of the Poritz test).
261. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
262. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1996).
263. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
discretion given to police officers in implementing Washington's Act).
264. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing Louisiana's
special clothing provision).
265. See supra note 7 (detailing the purpose of Megan's Law).
266. See supra notes 7, 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the high
recidivism statistics for sex offenders).
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often than any other type of criminal.2 67 Psychiatric research
further indicates that many sex offenders are virtually incur-
able and that treatment is rarely successful.2 6S
The Poritz test provides courts with the opportunity to
consider these policy issues. Under the second prong of Poritz,
a court could strike down a provision which may cause unnec-
essary adverse effects. 269  A provision, for instance, that re-
quired sex offenders to put bumper stickers on their cars stat-
ing "Convicted Sex Offender On Board" would fail the second
prong.27° The bumper sticker is excessive in accomplishing the
purpose of protecting the public because it would indiscrimi-
nately inform people without consideration of those individuals
who are likely to encounter the offender outside of the car,
where the potential threat lies. Thus, the Poritz test ensures
that courts will properly take policy considerations into ac-
count by weighing the need to protect the public against the
adverse effects on an offender.
Finally, courts following Poritz will not have to evaluate a
series of indefinite factors. Nor will they have to reconcile
considerations that point in opposite directions. Rather, those
courts may engage in well-reasoned analysis of the purpose
and effects of the challenged provisions. Courts applying the
Poritz test will properly strike down provisions producing ex-
cessive punitive effects and uphold narrowly drawn provisions.
C. MEGAN'S LAW UNDER THE PoRITZ TEST
In analyzing Megan's Law under the Poritz test, the Court
should first determine whether the legislative purpose is
regulatory or punitive.2 1 According to the statute, 7 2 the New
Jersey legislature intended to protect the public from dangers
267. See supra notes 7, 69-72 and accompanying text (noting that sex of-
fenders are "more likely than other convicts to strike again once released from
prison").
268. See supra note 67 (observing the growing consensus among psychia-
trists that sex offenders are "rarely treatable").
269. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text (discussing the sec-
ond prong of the Poritz test).
270. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing a Florida court
order that required a drunk driver to place a bumper sticker stating
"Convicted D.U.I. Restricted License" on his car).
271. See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (describing Poritz's
interpretation of Halper).
272. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7 (West Supp. 1996).
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posed by the risks of recidivism.273 Protecting the public is an
unambiguous regulatory purpose.
Next, the Court should determine whether the law as im-
plemented exceeds the purported purpose so as to become pu-
nitive.274 The plaintiff in Poritz based its claim that Megan's
Law constituted punishment on two grounds.275 First, the
challenger argued that Megan's Law served one of the tradi-
tional purposes of punishment: deterrence. 2 6 The challenger
did not offer proof that Megan's Law deterred individuals from
committing sex offenses because they would in turn be subject
to Megan's Law.277 A five-year study of Washington's statute
revealed that its notification laws had not had a deterrent ef-
fect.27' Rather, Washington's laws put the public on notice and,
in turn, aided police departments in apprehending repeat of-
fenders.27 9 Even if the challengers could prove that Megan's
Law had a deterrent effect, that effect would merely be an in-
evitable consequence of accomplishing the remedial purpose of
the law, not a purpose intended by the enacting legislature.28 °
Secondly, the challengers claimed that Megan's Law was
punitive because notification could potentially lead to harass-
ment, ostracism, and vigilantism.281' The Poritz dissent noted
two incidents in which Megan's Law led to vigilantism. 82 The
merit of the challengers' claim, however, does not depend on
whether they can prove that harassment, ostracism, and vigi-
273. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (detailing New Jersey's legis-
lative findings regarding recidivism).
274. See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (describing Poritz's
interpretation of Halper).
275. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 389 (N.J. 1995).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Wash-
ington state study).
279. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
280. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 396 (N.J. 1995) ("What counts.., is
the purpose and design of the statutory provision, its remedial goal and pur-
poses, and not the resulting consequential impact, the 'sting of punishment'
that may inevitably, but incidentally flow from it.").
281. Id. at 389. The challengers argued that the "government is responsi-
ble for the potential impacts that may result from notification, whether they
were intended or not, and that they may be so severe as to constitute punish-
ment." Id.
282. See supra note 192 (describing the two incidents of vigilantism).
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lantism may result. The challengers must show that the legis-
lature intended those results when it created the statute.8 3
In enacting Megan's Law, the New Jersey legislature de-
termined that the risks posed by sex offenders were great
enough to override the potential negative impact on sex offend-
ers.2" Megan's Law reflects the legislature's conclusion that a
community has a right to know when a sex offender moves into
its neighborhood in order to protect itself.285 Revealing the
names, addresses, and offenses committed by convicted sex of-
fenders is the essence and, consequently, inevitable conse-
quence of, Megan's Law.286 Accordingly, the mere possibility of
hostile public reaction to sex offenders does not convert Me-
gan's Law into punishment.2 87
The Poritz dissenter's argument that Megan's Law is tan-
tamount to "Scarlet Letter" punishment by humiliation is
similarly without merit.288  The crucial distinction between
"Scarlet Letter" laws and Megan's Law is that the sole purpose
of "Scarlet Letter" laws is to punish the offender,28 9 whereas
the purpose of Megan's Law is to protect the public.29 ° Under
Megan's Law, an offender's humiliation is an unintended con-
sequence of carrying out the regulatory purpose. Informing
residents of the presence of a sex offender could save lives.
Megan's parents did not know that a sex offender lived across
the street until it was too late. Thus, the mere fact that some
sex offenders may feel humiliated as a result of notification
should not transform a regulatory law into punishment.291
Under the Poritz test, proof of a punitive impact does not con-
vert a regulatory provision into punishment unless the provi-
283. See supra note 171 (explaining that the intent of the legislature is
what matters, not the consequential impact).
284. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (detailing the New Jersey
legislative findings).
285. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 372.
286. Id. at 376.
287. Id.
288. See supra note 192 (discussing the dissent's argument regarding
punishment by humiliation).
289. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
humiliation as punishment).
290. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (detailing New Jersey's legis-
lative findings and statement of purpose of Megan's Law).
291. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that the intent
of the legislature is what matters, not the consequential impact).
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sions exceed what is necessary to carry out the regulatory pur-
pose.2 9 2
Megan's Law does not go beyond its purported purpose.293
Megan's Law sets up different tiers of notification based on de-
terminations of the risks imposed by each individual sex of-
fender.294  The tiers restrict notification only to situations
where it is necessary to achieve the purpose of the statute:
public safety.295 For example, at tier three, the broadest level
of notification, only those "likely to encounter" the offender
may be notified.29 6 Thus, Megan's Law does not go beyond ne-
cessity to effectuate the purpose of the statute. Furthermore,
application of the Poritz test supports the conclusion that Me-
gan's Law is regulatory and, therefore, does not violate ex post
facto, cruel and unusual punishment, or double jeopardy pro-
tections.
CONCLUSION
The dangers posed by sex offenders prompted the vast
majority of states and the federal government to enact regis-
tration and notification provisions. The courts are divided on
the question of whether registration and notification laws are
punitive and, thus, in violation of ex post facto, cruel and un-
usual punishment, and double jeopardy protections. Courts
are also divided regarding what test should be used to make
the punishment determination.
The test advanced by Doe v. Poritz provides the most ap-
propriate and workable standard for determining whether a
law constitutes punishment. The Poritz test correctly follows
precedent, appropriately balances the purposes and effects of
provisions, and encourages state legislatures to draft narrowly
tailored provisions. The Poritz decision also takes the policy
considerations behind registration and notification laws into
account by weighing the need to protect the public against the
laws' adverse effects on sex offenders. Recognizing that the
292. See supra notes 174-175 (describing the second prong of the Poritz
test).
293. See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (describing Poritz's
interpretation of Halper).
294. See supra note 184 (discussing the legislative purpose of Megan's
Law).
295. See supra note 198 (describing the three tiers of notification as modi-
fied by Poritz).
296. See supra note 198.
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Poritz test outperforms the other tests, the Supreme Court
should uphold Megan's Law and apply the Poritz test in future
registration and notification law cases.

